Two recent exploits on Ethereum have reportedly drained around $4.48 million from K3 Capital’s sBOLD vault and Gonka’s Bridge, according to an alert by Blockaid on November 18th.
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Upon discovery of the exploit affecting K3 Capital, blockchain security firm Blockaid reported that approximately $3.43 million had been siphoned from the sBOLD vault in about 34 transactions. Following this alert, K3 Capital announced at 13:08 UTC that it was investigating suspicious activities related to the sBOLD, which resulted in the immediate suspension of its contract. At that time, no further details were given about loss estimates or a timeline for resuming vault operations.
In a separate notification, Blockaid stated that around $1.05 million had been extracted from the Gonka Bridge in approximately five distinct transactions, but investigations were ongoing. This alert also mentioned the unverified minting of WGNK concurrent with the drain.
Blockaid’s cumulative estimate of $4.48 million does not differentiate the newly minted WGNK tokens from the drained amounts.
K3 Capital Acts on Vault Losses from sBOLD
K3 Capital’s sBOLD initiative is officially described as a third-party vault created and maintained by the firm, allowing users to pool deposits in BOLD, a stablecoin governed by Liquity V2. The vault is structured to automatically reinvest earnings from Liquity’s stability pool, providing vault shares that represent a user’s stake in the pooled assets.
According to Liquity’s framework, the stability pools involve various collateral markets based on rETH, such as Wrapped Ether, Wrapped Staked Ether, and Rocket Pool. Deposits made in BOLD are intended to secure debt obligations when borrowers’ positions get liquidated, thereby providing collateral benefits to users alongside interest income from borrowers. The K3 vault simplifies reinvestment processes for users participating via sBOLD.
Blockaid revealed that the exploit allowed malicious actors to acquire vault shares at minimal costs, enabling them to redeem BOLD that belonged to other depositors. The analysis by Bitquery assessed the vault’s losses at $3.42 million, identifying 97 transactional actions over 37 Ethereum blocks, with about 57 stemming from a single automated bot. This bot-driven activity reportedly made up 56% of the total value extracted from the vault.
Moreover, Bitquery traced $1.78 million in payments directed to block builders who facilitate transactions on Ethereum, attributing this to roughly 52% of the identified losses. The payments originated from assets removed from the vault, although Bitquery found no proof that the bot creators were aware of their actions.
This adverse event unfolded in a tight span of just eight minutes, from 12:25:23 to 12:33:35 UTC. Notably, just 35 minutes prior to K3 Capital’s public announcement about the suspension, the vault’s entire holdings had been depleted during that timeframe. The comprehensive review by K3 Capital included Ethereum balance tracking up to 16:14 UTC on November 18th.
The accounts from K3 Capital and Blockaid diverged regarding the events within Liquity. While Blockaid initially pointed to the liquidation of positions, typically referred to as “treasure troves” in liquidity contexts, Bitquery’s transaction analysis uncovered no significant liquidations. K3 Capital’s initial communications did not elucidate the reasons behind the vault’s losses.
Security Breach: Gonka Bridge and Minting of WGNK
Blockaid linked the Gonka Bridge breach to a modification in the signing key of the Ethereum bridge, which enabled attackers to drain remaining stablecoins and mint unbacked WGNK tokens—an Ethereum variant of the native GNK token.
As per Gonka’s bridge documentation, in standard operations, stablecoins like USDT and USDC are secured on Ethereum, enabling wrapped versions to circulate on the Gonka network. Upon the return of assets, the bridge permits the redemption of original stablecoins held on Ethereum, which are backed by existing reserve balances.
In contrast, transferring GNK tokens back requires using a different balance. Gonka’s documentation specifies that native GNK tokens are held in escrow within the Gonka network, prompting the issuance of an equivalent amount of WGNK on Ethereum. The bridge contract also serves as the operational framework for the WGNK token.
Typically, WGNK is generated on Ethereum through a contract, while the corresponding GNK is simultaneously released from escrow on the Gonka network.
