Congress has long recognized that stablecoins should not function as unregulated bank deposits. The intent of the recently enacted GENIUS law is clear. It prohibits issuers of stablecoins from paying interest or yield to holders and maintains the distinction between payment instruments and bank deposits, which are used not only for payment purposes but also as store value.
However, loopholes have already emerged. Some crypto exchanges and affiliated platforms currently offer “rewards” akin to interest to stablecoin holders, potentially undermining the stability of traditional banking systems and constraining community trust.
Terminology is important. Credit card rewards are funded by interchange fees, which are paid to encourage spending. Earn points by using your card. Stablecoin “rewards” are different.彼らは、ステーブルコインを裏付ける準備金を通常は財務省短期証券やマネーマーケットファンドに投資し、その利息収入を保有者に渡すことで資金を調達している。 You earn returns by holding stablecoins, not by using them. Economically, this is indistinguishable from a bank deposit that pays interest.
When a platform advertises a “5% reward” for holding stablecoins, it typically backs those tokens with U.S. Treasuries yielding around 4.5% and passes that yield on to users. Whether labeled as reward, yield, or dividend, their function is the same: interest on deposits. Banks perform similar activities (accepting deposits, investing in loans, and repaying depositors) but face much higher costs, including FDIC insurance, capital requirements, and compliance obligations that stablecoin issuers largely avoid.
There is precedent for this dynamic. 1970 年代から 1980 年代初頭にかけて、レギュレーション Q により銀行預金金利の上限が 5.25% に制限される一方、インフレと財務省利回りは 15% 以上に急上昇しました。 Money market funds filled the gap by providing market interest rates directly to consumers. Deposits were drained from small banks that lost their capital base, and large money center institutions acquired reserves. The result was widespread disintermediation, the collapse of the savings and loan industry, and the agricultural credit crisis of the 1980s.
Stablecoin “rewards” risk repeating that history.マネー・マーケット・ファンドが規制された預金金利と市場金利とのギャップを利用したのと同じように、ステーブルコイン・プラットフォームは、銀行が利益を上げて支払うことができる金額と、最小限のオーバーヘッドで財務省の利回りを通過させることで、規制の緩い発行体が提供できる金額との差を利用します。
Some people wonder why banks can’t raise interest rates on deposits. The answer lies in the structure. Banks operate under fundamentally different business models and cost frameworks. They pay FDIC insurance premiums, maintain capital reserves, and comply with extensive oversight, costs that are not borne by most stablecoin issuers. Banks also use deposits to make loans, so they must hold capital against potential losses. Stablecoin issuers can pass almost all of the yield earned simply by holding reserves in ultra-safe assets.
To match a 5% “reward,” banks would need to earn 6% to 7% on their loan portfolios, an unrealistic goal in today’s environment, especially for smaller regional banks. The result is not fair competition, but a structural disadvantage for regulated depository institutions.
The Consumer Bankers Association has warned that the loophole could trigger a massive shift of deposits from local banks to global custodians.同協会は財務省の推計を引用し、利回りプログラムが引き続き許容される場合、最大6兆6000億ドルの預金がステーブルコインに移行する可能性があると指摘している。 GENIUS 法の禁止事項は発行者に限定的に適用されるため、取引所や仲介業者は依然として別の用語で金銭的利益を提供する可能性があります。 This opens the door to affiliate agreements that recreate the essence of interest payments without any legal liability.
Those reserves go beyond the local economy.最大のステーブルコイン発行者は、ニューヨークメロン銀行などの世界的な保管機関、ブラックロックなどの企業が管理するマネーマーケットファンド、あるいは許可されている場合は連邦準備制度理事会と直接資金を保有している。コミュニティ銀行の預金者が 10 万ドルをステーブルコインに移すと、その資本は地元銀行から出て、システム上重要な機関に集中します。 Community banks lose their ability to lend. Megabanks and the Fed acquire reserves.その結果、マネーマーケットファンド危機を彷彿とさせる集中的なリスクプロファイルによる仲介の排除が実現します。
The Progressive Policy Institute estimates that community banks, which account for about 60% of small business loans and 80% of agricultural loans nationwide, could be most affected. That risk is especially important in Louisiana, where local banks lend to small businesses and family farms. If deposits shift to unregulated digital assets, community bank lending could become strained, especially in rural parishes and underserved communities.
Brookings Institution research reinforces the need for regulatory equivalence. The label “remuneration” does not change the fact that these payments are economic interest.仲介業者が預金保険や健全性の監視なしで利回りを生み出すことを許可すると、2008年のマネー・マーケット・ファンド危機の際に見られたのと同様の脆弱性が再び生じる可能性がある。
To maintain financial stability, policymakers need to move to close the stablecoin interest rate loophole. Clarifying that the interest prohibition applies to all entities, not just issuers, would protect Congress’s intent. Regulators such as the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and federal banking agencies may also treat “incentive” programs as equivalent to deposit interest for supervisory purposes.
ステーブルコインは支払いにおいて真の効率性を提供しますが、チェックされていない利回り機能により、ステーブルコインが規制のない銀行になってしまうリスクがあります。歴史は、規制上の裁定取引によって競合他社が監視なしに預金に似た商品を提供できるようになると何が起こるかを示しています。 deposit flight, institutional instability, and the flight of capital from community financial institutions. By acting now, we can maintain stability, protect depositors, and preserve the credit channels that support community lending. That’s especially true in states like Louisiana, where community banks remain a mainstay on Main Street.
Dr. Rajesh P. Narayanan is the Louisiana Bankers Association Professor of Finance in the College of Finance at Louisiana State University.
