Jason Lowery’s “Softwarewar” paper has been met with harsh criticism. Many argue that it presents a fragmented perspective on cybersecurity and merely rehashes outdated topics that were previously investigated years before Lowery rose to prominence in the technology sector.
To start, the concept of nation-states engaging in mining as a measure of “defensive weapons” is not novel. This notion has been floated since 2011-2013 and is not a fresh idea from Lowery. Bitcoin enthusiasts who have engaged deeply with the technology have long considered the implications of mining in relation to the cryptocurrency’s success and the roles of various states.
If Bitcoin were to gain significant geopolitical importance, it stands to reason that countries would have a vested interest in the mining industry. As regulators of key commodities like gold, oil, and gas, nation-states are already involved in overseeing production processes. This idea isn’t groundbreaking; it’s common sense for anyone who has been active in the Bitcoin community for a decade or more.
However, the claim that Bitcoin offers data protection is simply unfounded. While users can timestamp their data on the blockchain, that action doesn’t inherently secure it. Bitcoin does not safeguard against unauthorized access; any data on the blockchain is accessible to anyone operating a node. The assumption that Bitcoin can somehow regulate data access is utterly flawed. By its inherent design, data stored on Bitcoin is open to everyone, which contradicts the very premise of privacy and protection.
Next, let’s discuss paywalls and the concept of “digital energy.” Lowery proposes the idea of enhancing security through charging for API calls in Bitcoin. This notion is misguided for a couple of reasons: firstly, access to an API may be restricted for resource management or to limit access to certain individuals, but using Bitcoin doesn’t adequately address either concern.
While charging with Bitcoin may have some impact on resource management, it does not prevent Distributed Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Attackers can still flood your services with packets regardless of payment, necessitating traditional defense measures to manage that traffic. Implementing a system that relies on financial payment does not eliminate the need for conventional security practices.
Access restriction is effectively managed through already existing technologies like encryption and password protection, which are independent of Bitcoin. Even if a system is well designed, its security ultimately relies on the effectiveness of its hardware and software. A server can be compromised not due to Bitcoin’s interference, but rather if its security measures are inadequate.
Ultimately, Bitcoin or even cryptography cannot secure a system if it is poorly implemented or flawed. This principle is fundamental to cybersecurity, and Bitcoin cannot alter that reality. Additionally, shortcomings in hardware and security software further complicate this challenge. Lowery’s arguments in this regard come off as ramblings that lack coherence and logical foundation, appearing more like an attempt to deceive those lacking knowledge in the field.
Moreover, the idea that Bitcoin mining could lead to a reduction in wars between nations is also viewed as implausible. Mining activities do not alter the geopolitical influences surrounding land, resources, or military positioning—factors that traditionally ignite conflicts among nations.
In summary, Lowery does not present a compelling thesis but rather assembles a collection of scattered ideas based on observations that many within the Bitcoin community have been aware of for years. Ultimately, this raises questions about the credibility of his claims and the critical thinking skills of anyone who accepts them at face value.
This article represents the perspective of the author and does not necessarily reflect the views of BTC Inc or Bitcoin Magazine.
